Abstract. Lattices over number elds arise from a variety of sources in algorithmic algebra and more recently cryptography. Similar to the classical case of Z-lattices, the choice of a nice, short (pseudo)-basis is important in many applications. In this article, we provide the rst algorithm that computes such a short (pseudo)-basis. We utilize the LLL algorithm for Z-lattices together with the Bosma-Pohst-Cohen Hermite Normal Form and some size reduction technique to nd a pseudo-basis where each basis vector belongs to the lattice and the product of the norms of the basis vectors is bounded by the lattice determinant, up to a multiplicative factor that is a eld invariant. As it runs in polynomial time, this provides an eective variant of Minkowski's second theorem for lattices over number elds.
Introduction
Let K be a number eld and O K be its maximal order. An O K -module M is a nitely generated set of elements which is closed under addition and multiplication by elements in O K . Frequently, we have M ⊆ K m for some m. In the case of K being Q, we have O K = Z, thus O K -modules are just the classical Z-lattices. Since Z is a principal ideal domain, every (torsion free) module is free, thus there exists a basis b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ M for some n ≤ m such that M = ⊕ i≤n Zb i . Any two bases (b i ) i and (c i ) i have the same cardinality and are linked by some unimodular matrix T ∈ GL(n, Z). The choice of a good basis is crucial for almost all computational problems attached to M . Generally one tries to nd a basis whose vectors have short Euclidean norms, using, for example, the LLL algorithm [15] .
Replacing Z by the maximal order O K makes the classication more complicated since O K may no longer be a principal ideal domain. However, since O K is still a Dedekind domain, the modules M ⊆ K It should be noted that b i may not belong to M , and in fact b i ∈ M if and only if 1 ∈ b i . Similarly to the case of Z-lattices, dierent pseudo-bases share the same cardinality, and it is known how to move from a pseudo-basis to another.
As for Z-lattices, the choice of the pseudo-basis is of utmost importance.
However, a key dierence is that no analogue of LLL is known, as repeatedly noted in [7] . There have been attempts [10, 22, 11] but the algorithms are either limited to certain elds or give no guaranteed bounds on the output size. While every O K -module is also a Z-lattice and can thus be analyzed with all the tools available over Z, for many applications the additional structure as an O K -module is important. This structure is typically lost when applying techniques over Z.
Originally, O K -modules mainly came from the study of nite extensions of K but now they occur in a wider range of problems from group theory (matrix groups and representations [9] ) to applications in geometry (automorphism algebras of Abelian varieties). O K -modules also occur in lattice-based cryptography [17, 19, 2426] , and in that context the module rank n is usually poly-logarithmic in the degree of the number eld. Cryptography based on O Kmodules is increasingly popular, as on one side they lead to compact representations and to fast operations, and on the other side they enjoy a worst-case to average-case reduction for variants of the shortest vector problem, which allows the cryptographic security to be based on worst-case hardness assumptions.
As diverse as the applications are the requirements: only one (or more) short module element(s) may be needed, or a short (pseudo)-basis may be required, some applications rely on canonical representations, while any representation may suce for others. We note that canonical representations tend to have components that are much larger than short representations as obtained by lattice reduction or our techniques. To nd one short element it suces to consider the underlying Z-module (of dimension nd with d = [K : Q]). For Z-lattices contained in Q m , a canonical representation is the Hermite Normal Form (HNF).
It has been generalized (BPC-HNF) to O K -modules contained in K m by Bosma and Pohst [4] and Cohen [7, Chap. 1.4 ] (see also [12] ).
Our results. In the present work, we describe an algorithm that computes a pseudo-basis made of short vectors. Given an arbitrary pseudo-basis
where the O(·)'s depend only on the eld K and the choice of a given LLLreduced integral basis, the euclidean norm · is a module extension of the T 2 -norm over K, and the λ i (M )'s correspond to the module minima. We refer to Corollary 1 for a precise statement. Overall, this provides a module equivalent to LLL-reduced bases of Z-lattices in the sense that the vectors cannot be arbitrarily longer than the minima. Since it runs in polynomial time, it can also be interpreted as an eective approximate variant of the adaptation to O K -modules of Minkowski's second theorem (given in Theorem 2). We also study the representation of one-dimensional O K -modules, i.e., modules that are isomorphic to ideals of O K . We show how to modify Belabas' 2-element representation algorithm [2, Alg. 6.15] so that the output is provably small. Combining the latter and our module pseudo-reduction algorithm leads to compact representations of O K -modules.
The most natural approach to obtain reduced pseudo-bases consists in trying to generalize LLL, but as mentioned earlier all previous attempts have only partially succeeded. In contrast, we start by viewing the O K -module as a highdimensional Z-lattice. We nd short module elements by applying LLL to a basis of the latter lattice and interpreting the output as module elements. At this point, we have a pseudo-basis (the input) and a full-rank set of short module vectors (produced by LLL). If we had a Z-lattice instead of an O K -module, we would then use a technique common in the lattice-based cryptography community (see, e.g., [20, Le. 7 .1]), consisting in using the HNF to convert a full rank set of short lattice vectors to a short basis. We adapt this technique to number elds, using the BPC-HNF and introducing a size-reduction algorithm for pseudo-bases.
Let us compare (pseudo-)LLL-reduced and BPC-HNF pseudo-bases. A theoretical advantage of the LLL approach is that it is not restricted to K m but also works in a continuous extension (similarly to LLL-reduction being welldened for real lattices). It should also be signicantly more ecient to work with pseudo-bases made of short vectors because smaller integers and polynomials of smaller degrees are involved. On the other side, (pseudo-)LLL-reduced pseudo-bases are far from being unique, and seem more expensive to obtain.
Road-map. In Section 2, we give some reminders and elementary results on lattices, number elds and modules. In Section 3, we modify Belabas' 2-element representation algorithm for ideals of O K , as described above. We then give our module reduction algorithm in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we describe our implementation and give some examples.
Implementation. The algorithms have been implemented in the Magma computer algebra system [3, 18] and are available on request. They will be part of upcoming releases.
Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with the geometry of numbers and algebraic number theory. We refer to [16, 20] , [5, 21] 
Lattices
In this work, we will call any nitely generated free Z-module L a lattice. A usual lattice corresponds to the case where L is a discrete additive subgroup of R n for some n. [13] .
In order to quantify the smallness of an element of a lattice L, we associate to L a positive denite bilinear form q :
by b q , and may omit the subscript if it is clear from the context. The de-
1/2 , does not depend on the particular choice of the basis of L. Note that if L ⊆ R n and q is the
We dene the lattice minima as follows:
Minkowski's second theorem states that vector space), a signicant advantage of the LLL-reduction over the HNF is that it provides small lattice elements. However, it seems more expensive to obtain and the uniqueness of the representation is lost. Taking the HKZ-reduction instead of the LLL-reduction allows one to take γ = 1/2 √ d + 3 (see [14] ), but the complexity of the best algorithm for computing it [1] is exponential in d.
Let (b i ) i≤d be a lattice basis. For any i > j, we dene A standard technique in the lattice-based cryptography community (see, e.g., [20, Le. 7 .1]) allows one to derive a short lattice basis from an arbitrary basis (a i ) i and a full-rank free set of short lattice vectors (s i ) i . As we will adapt this technique to modules, we describe it briey. Since the s i 's belong to the lattice, 
n , then all the computations may be performed in polynomial time.
Number elds
Let K be a number eld of degree d, with real and complex embeddings (
The r i 's form an integral basis of K, and we have K = O K ⊗Q. We dene K R = K ⊗R, which is isomorphic (as rings) to R s1 × C s2 , and extend the θ i 's to K R . Many quadratic forms may be associated to K R , but the most natural one derives from q(
with our denition, the norm cannot be negative.
A (fractional) ideal I is any nitely generated O K -module contained in K. An integral ideal I is a fractional ideal contained in O K . For any fractional ideal I there exists r ∈ Z such that rI is an integral ideal. If r ∈ K, we let (r) denote the (principal) ideal rO K . The product IJ = ij : i ∈ I, j ∈ J and the sum I + J = {i + j : i ∈ I, j ∈ J} of two ideals are also ideals. A nonzero integral ideal is said to be prime if it is divisible only by O K and itself. As O K is a Dedekind domain, any non-zero fractional ideal can be uniquely decomposed as a product of (possibly negative) powers of prime ideals. If p is a prime ideal, we dene ν p (I) = max(k ∈ Z : p k |I). The norm of I is dened
We dene N (0) = 0, which allows us to assert that N (IJ) = N (I)N (J) for any ideals I and J. Note that if I = (r) is principal, then N (I) = N (r).
non-zero fractional ideal I is also a fractional ideal, and we have II
Note that the arithmetic over the ideals can be performed in polynomial time (e.g., see [2] ).
Any non-zero ideal, including the maximal order, is naturally a free Z-module of rank d thus a lattice under the T 2 -norm. By xing an integral basis for K, we also x a Z-lattice structure for O K that we can then reduce. We say that a basis of a non-zero fractional ideal I is in HNF if the (rational) matrix of the coecients with respect to a xed integral basis of K is in HNF. This provides a unique representation for any ideal. In the following, we assume that we know an integral basis (r i ) i of K that is LatRed-reduced with respect to T 2 . It can be known for particular K's (e.g., cyclotomic number elds, with max r i 2 = d),
or can be computed by reducing an arbitrary integral basis. As it is computed once and for all, it may prove interesting to strongly reduce it. We have the following result.
Proof. Using the reducedness and Minkowski's second theorem, we get
The bounds of our main results involve the quantity max r i . Lemma 1 allows one to express them with eld invariants only. We choose to keep max r i in our bounds since it can be much smaller, as in the case of cyclotomic number elds.
With our a choice of integral basis, any element of O K with small T 2 -norm can be represented with a small number of bits.
Lemma 2. Assume that
Proof. We show by induction of i that
. Suppose now that i < d and that the result holds for any j > i. The GSO of the r i 's shows that x ≥ |x i + j>i µ j,i x j | r * i . Therefore, we have |x i | ≤ x / r * i + j>i |x j |, which gives the bound. To complete the proof, note that the reducedness of the r i 's gives min j r * j ≥ 2 −d/2 min j r j , and that r j ≥ √ d for all j. 
O
Cohen [6] generalized the HNF to modules in K m . The algorithm of [4] may also be interpreted as such a generalization. We refer to [12, Chap. 4 ] for a detailed exposure and comparison. 
i . We dene det(M ) as the square root of the determinant of the nd × nd symmetric positive denite matrix T
This is a module invariant. When M is a non-zero fractional ideal of O K , this matches det T2 (M ). It should be noted that det(M ) is not immediately related to the (Steinitz) class of M nor to the maximal exterior power of M . The following is a direct consequence of Minkowski's second theorem over Z-lattices.
Theorem 2. Let
Proof 
We now extend the concept of GSO.
Small 2-element representation of an ideal
We start our study of O K -modules by the one-dimensional case, i.e., fractional ideals of K. There are several ways of representing an ideal I = 0. A natural approach is to provide a basis (b i ) i≤d ∈ K 
Alternatively, one may use the so-called two-element representation: any ideal I may be written I = (x 1 ) + (x 2 ) for some x 1 , x 2 ∈ I. A classical way to obtain such a representation consists in taking an arbitrary x 1 ∈ I and then choosing x 2 uniformly in I modulo (x 1 )
(the latter being a full-rank sublattice of the former). This succeeds with prob- 
We modify Belabas' algorithm to provide a 2-element representation made of small elements: I = (x 1 ) + (x 2 ) with both x 1 and x 2 small. For instance, the rst element x 1 is chosen to be the rst element of a LatRed-reduced basis of I.
This may be seen as a rigorous variant of [7, Alg. 1.3.15], in which smallness was provided but the success probability could be small. Although our analysis is close to Belabas', we give a full proof, as there are quite a few small dierences. Theorem 3. Let (r i ) i be an integral basis of a number eld K. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes as inputs a Z-basis of a non-zero fractional ideal I of O K and a success parameter t (in unary), and returns x 1 , x 2 ∈ I such that I = (x 1 ) + (x 2 ) holds with probability 1 − 2 −t , and:
where · corresponds to the T 2 norm and γ is the LatRed approximation constant. As a consequence, the ideal I may be represented on 5 log 2 N (I) + O(log ∆ K + d(d + log k + log max r i )) bits, where k is the smallest non-zero integer such that kI is integral and the r i 's are assumed LatRed-reduced.
Let us comment on (1). The quantity 4γ
K is an invariant of the eld, and max r i 4 is independent from I (and can be bounded using Lemma 1).
The only term that is not an invariant is N (I) We do not know how to reach this bound for x 2 .
Let us now prove Theorem 3. Since the smallest integer k such that kI is integral can be computed eciently, we assume that I is integral. As the ideal I is given by a Z-basis, we can nd a basis of it that is LatRed-reduced (for T 2 ).
The algorithm of Figure 1 is an adaptation of [2, Alg. 6.15]. We follow the algorithm step by step. The reducedness of the input directly gives that x 1 ≤ Inputs: A LatRed-reduced basis of a non-zero integral ideal I of OK ; a success parameter t. Output: x1, x2 ∈ I such that I = (x1) + (x2), or Fail. 1 . Let x1 be the rst basis element; a := (x1). If I = a, return x1 and x2 := 0. 2. Find y such that y log y = log N (a); S := {p prime : N (p) ≤ y}. 3 14. Size-reduce α0 and α1 with respect to the b · ri's. 15 . Return x1 and x2 := (π0α1 + α0)(π1α0 + α1). 
As a consequence, the variable y of Step 2, can be bounded by a polynomial in d, log N (I) and log ∆ K . This ensures that the computation of S can be done in polynomial time. At Step 3, the computations of a 0 , I 0 , a 1 and I 1 can be performed in polynomial time: this follows from the above study of S. We have a = a 0 a 1 and I = I 0 I 1 . We also have I i |a i and I i +a 1−i = O K for i ∈ {0, 1}.
As a 1 is a full-rank sublattice of I 1 , sampling π 1 uniformly in I 1 /a 1 can be done in polynomial time. The equality I 1 = a 1 + (π 1 ) can also be tested in polynomial time (see, e.g., [20, Prop. 8.2] 
As a consequence, the algorithm returns Fail at Step 6 with probability ≤ 2 −t .
At
Step 8, the b · r i 's are a basis of a sublattice of a 1 . Therefore, after Step 8, we still have I 1 = a 1 + (π 1 ). After the size-reduction of π 1 with respect to the b · r i 's, we have:
It is shown in [2] that Step 9 can be performed in polynomial time. The bounds on S imply that Step 10 can be done in polynomial time.
Step 11 ensures that
After
Step 11, we still have that ν p (π 0 ) = ν p (I 0 ), for all p ∈ S, and thus I 0 = a 0 + (π 0 ). It is shown in [2] that Step 12 can be performed in polynomial time.
Step 14 ensures that α 0 ,
Since a = a 0 a 1 , we still have α i ∈ a i after Step 14, for i ∈ {0, 1}. At Step 15, we have:
where we used the fact that N (a 1 ) = N (a)/N (a 0 ) ≤ N (a)/N (I 0 ). Combining the latter with (2) provides the upper bound on x 2 from Theorem 3. Also, we have that π i := π i α 1−i + α i is congruent to π i modulo a i and to 1 modulo a 1−i , for i ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, we have I i = a i + (π i ) and I i + (π i−1 ) = O K . Finally, we obtain I = I 0 I 1 = a 0 a 1 + (π 0 π 1 ) = (x 1 ) + (x 2 ), thus proving the correctness of the algorithm.
We now consider the amount of space needed to represent the coordinates of x 1 and x 2 with respect to the integral basis (r i ) i . We write x j = y 2. Let t1, . . . , tn be the columns of T t .
Compute the BPC-HNF
Let T be the matrix whose rows are the (t i ) t 's, and U = T (T ) 
Theorem 4. If given as inputs a pseudo-basis
R and a full-rank set (s i ) i of vectors in M , then the algorithm of Figure 2 returns a pseudo-basis
n×n non-singular. It therefore suces to prove that for
j , where U = U −1 . This is ensured by Theorem 1: as the pseudo-bases 
If M ⊆ K m and LatRed is LLL, then it terminates in polynomial time.
Proof. The operations performed on the pseudo-basis can be checked to preserve the generated module and the b * i 's. Steps 2, 6 and 7 ensure that the µ i,j 's of the output pseudo-basis satisfy µ i,j ≤ √ dγ∆ 
ras' theorem then provides the result. 
Let y be the size-reduction of µi,j with respect to the xi,jr k 's, bi := (x) −1 bi; bi := xbi. 
Proof. The fact that the algorithm returns a pseudo-basis of M is easy to check.
Also, at the end of Step 1, we have that b i ∈ M , for all i. Since the x of Step 3 belongs to b i , the latter fact is preserved throughout the rest of the execution.
The equality span j≤i b j = span j≤i s j directly derives from Theorems 4 and 5.
At any time after
Step 1, we have O K ⊆ b i and thus N (b i ) ≤ 1. At Step 3,
we have x ≤ γ∆ K s * i , which is preserved throughout Step 5. Also, the arithmetic-geometric
Step 4 the quantity N (b i ) has been divided by N (x) and we have N (
Using Theorem 5, this allows us to derive that at the end of the execution we have:
The inequalities s * j ≤ s j lead to the result.
Computing a short pseudo-basis
Suppose we have a pseudo-basis of an O K -module M of rank n. We can expand it to obtain a basis of M as a Z-module. By LLL-reducing the latter with respect to T 2 , we obtain dn module vectors whose integer linear combinations span M .
By using linear algebra over K, it is possible to select n module vectors s 1 , . . . , s n among these dn vectors, such that rank K (s i ) = n. Furthermore, thanks to the initial reduction, these vectors are also small, and we can apply Theorem 6. Corollary 1. There exists an algorithm that takes as input a pseudo-basis of
Therefore:
If M ⊆ K m and LatRed is LLL, then it terminates in polynomial time, and the output may be stored on a number of bits bounded by
Proof. Let L denote M when considered as a lattice. Let (s i ) i≤dn be a LLLreduced basis of L. We have Note that the norm bound on the ideals depends only on the eld and the choice for LatRed and is, in particular, independent of M .
By applying Corollary 1 with m = n = 1, we obtain yet another compact representation of ideals of K. If I is an ideal and k is the smallest non-zero integer such that kI is integral, then we see that I can be represented on log 2 N (I) + O(log ∆ K + d(d + log k + log max i r i )) bits. If N (I) is large, this representation is smaller than the one from Theorem 3, but for a small N (I), this is the opposite as the O(·) constant is larger. Considering ((x 1 )+(x 2 )) instead of its inverse leads to a representation whose bit-size grows faster with respect to d.
Short almost free pseudo-bases
A common strengthening of the properties of a pseudo-basis is to pass to an almost free (or Steinitz) representation: For any M , there exists a pseudo-basis One can use Lemma 3 to progressively change the short pseudo-basis obtained in Corollary 1 into a short almost free pseudo-basis, collecting all the coecient ideals into the last one. The corresponding algorithm is given in Figure 5 . It can be checked that the output is an almost free pseudo-basis of the input module.
Output: An almost free pseudo-basis of M . 1. For i = 1 to n − 1 do 2.
Use Lemma 3 with a := ai, b := ai+1 to nd a, b, x, y as indicated,
3.
Replace ai by aai + bai+1 and ai+1 by yai + xai+1,
4.
Replace ai+1 by aiai+1 and ai by OK . by the corresponding λ i (M )) up to a multiplicative factor that is independent of M . Similarly, the norm of the non-trivial coecient ideal can also be bounded independently of M .
Finally, it should be noted that the basis generated by the algorithm of Figure 5 satises b i ∈ span j≤i+1 a j for i < n, and thus can be compared to the results from [8] .
Examples
We start by some example coming from group theory, focusing only on the use of lattice reduction. Representations of nite groups give easy access to non-trivial and interesting lattices. In general starting with a nite subgroup G < GL(m, K) and any O K -module N we obtain a G-invariant O K -module M via M := g∈G N g. Next we change G to act on M , G ∈ GL(M ) and, xing a complex conjugation on K, obtain a G-invariant Hermitean form on K m from H := g∈G g * g. The main application is to nd a reduced (short) pseudo-basis S = M T for M and then replace G by G T = {T −1 gT : g ∈ G} to nd an isomorphic version of G where the elements are (hopefully) smaller. Let G be the quaternion group Q 8 with 8 elements. As a subgroup of GL(2, K) for K := Q(i), it can be generated by which is a nicer version of G.
Let G := SZ 8 the 8th Suzuki group with 29 120 elements. This group has 11 characters, and we consider the second among them. The latter denes a representation of degree 14 over some eld containing i. For theoretical reasons, the representation can be dened over Q(i), but it is initially computed over Q(ζ 52 ), of degree 24. A complicated procedure will now nd a representation over Q(i), i.e., we have three matrices (one for each generator) over Q(i) generating G.
The coecients of the original matrix entries over Q(ζ 52 ) have about 100 digits each, and over Q(i) this increases to about 200 digits. In this representation the group G xes a Hermitean form M which has again entries with about 200 digits each. Since the representation is absolutely irreducible, the quadratic form is unique up to multiplication by scalars. We normalized the form to have 1 as the entry in position (1, 1). After application of our reduction technique, the form as well as the representation now have only 1 digit entries. The module used here is generated by Ge 1 ⊆ Q(i) The function Nice implements the procedure outlined above. Note that the actual result can vary substantially as several parts use randomized algorithms.
The Sprint statements are only used as a very crude indication of the output size, they simply give the number of characters neccessary to write the generating matrices for G.
